Race and Gender on the Bench: How Best to Achieve Diversity in Judicial Selection by Anastopoulo, Constance A. & Crooks, Daniel J., III
Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 2
Spring 2013
Race and Gender on the Bench: How Best to
Achieve Diversity in Judicial Selection
Constance A. Anastopoulo
canastopoulo@charlestonlaw.edu
Daniel J. Crooks III
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Constance A. Anastopoulo and Daniel J. Crooks III, Race and Gender on the Bench: How Best to Achieve Diversity in Judicial Selection, 8
Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y. 174 (2013).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol8/iss2/2
Copyright 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 8 (Spring 2013) 
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 
 
Race and Gender on the Bench: How Best to 
Achieve Diversity in Judicial Selection 
 
Constance A. Anastopoulo* and Daniel J. Crooks III† 
ABSTRACT 
How can states increase diversity on the bench? This article begins by presuming 
that increasing racial and gender diversity is a worthy goal—among other positive 
results, a diverse bench increases the judicial system’s perceived legitimacy by 
increasing a diverse citizenry’s confidence that judges will treat them fairly and 
impartially. Next we examine the unique judicial selection systems of South Carolina and 
Virginia—where the entire process is controlled exclusively by the state legislature—and 
reach the counterintuitive conclusion that these systems actually increase judicial 
diversity very effectively when compared with the systems of other states. Finally, we 
propose four specific reforms to improve the already effective systems in South Carolina 
and Virginia: (1) preclude sitting legislators from membership, at least in the majority, 
on any merit selection commission; (2) raise the cap in South Carolina on the number of 
qualified applicants submitted to the General Assembly from the current three to at least 
ten, or in Virginia place a reasonable limit on the number of names submitted to the 
legislative delegation from which they may select; (3) require any merit selection 
commission, including the Judicial Merit Selection Committee in South Carolina, to give 
“substantial weight” to ethics decisions rendered by a tribunal within the judicial 
department; and (4) include the state’s Bar association in the selection process. 
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 “Too many Americans don’t understand the importance of minority rights and the 
independent judiciary.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the different processes of judicial selection 
employed in various states throughout the country. A large amount of the focus has been 
on the importance of an independent and diverse judiciary and how best to achieve these 
objectives in the judicial selection process in order to ensure this result.  There is a 
longstanding belief that the judiciary must be structured so as to instill confidence in 
citizens that court decisions will be fair and impartial.2  Much of the focus in promoting 
diversity at all levels of state judiciaries has been to enhance the legitimacy of the judicial 
system in the eyes of an ever-more diverse public.  Demographic imbalance in the 
composition of the judiciary, as well as any actual or perceived lack of independence, 
may erode citizens’ confidence that judges will treat them fairly and impartially.  A lack 
of independence, whether actual or perceived, undermines the legitimacy of the state 
court system.  
When the public loses confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the courts, 
justice and democracy themselves are at stake.  The lack of diversity “can malign the 
legitimacy of not only lawyers, but the law itself.”3 A recent report from the New York 
University Brennan Center entitled Improving Judicial Diversity recognized that the 
nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court in 2009 highlighted the 
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2 CIARA TORES-SPELLISCY ET AL., IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 4 (Brennan Center for Justice ed., 2nd 
ed. 2010). 
3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIVERSITY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS 31 (Cie 
Armstead ed., A.B.A. Presidential Initiative Commission on Diversity 2010). 
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issue of diversity, particularly gender, on the bench.4 The report noted that as Sotomayor 
proceeded through the nomination process, attention was focused on the fact that “of 111 
Supreme Court Justices in the Court’s history since 1789, 106 have been white men.”5  
Sotomayor was only the third person of color and only the third woman appointed to 
serve in the Court’s 221-year history.6  Her nomination keenly illustrated the lack of 
diversity on the country’s highest court.  More importantly, her nomination suggested 
that the problem with respect to state courts may be even greater.7   
Despite the fact that women now comprise forty-eight percent of law school 
graduates and forty-five percent of law firm associates, they make up only twenty-six 
percent of state judiciaries and twenty-two percent of the federal judiciary.8   To be sure, 
some progress has been made.  For example, twenty states across the nation now have a 
woman serving as chief justice of their highest court, a number higher than at any other 
time in the history of the United States.9  Nevertheless, evidence in states such as South 
Carolina suggests a broader problem on the circuit, or lower-level, courts. These courts 
handle the bulk of cases in the court system and serve a broad range of constituencies.  
Conversely, appellate courts are more removed from the litigants who are at the heart of 
the legal system.  Therefore, while gains have been made in terms of diversity in the 
appellate courts, there is still much work to be done in the lower-level courts.    
According to the 2010 Brennan Center report, most judiciaries do not reflect the 
diversity in their states.10 Unfortunately, there are no simple answers to the problem 
posed by the lack of diversity in the judiciary. One challenge arises from the fact that 
judges are not selected in a uniform manner on the state level.  Most states employ a 
system of either merit selection, such as Florida or Maryland, or judicial election, such as 
North Carolina or Georgia.  However, both systems are equally challenged when it comes 
to addressing the issue of diversity on the bench.  Moreover, other states employ a hybrid 
of the two systems—such as the “Missouri Plan”—that raises separate and distinct 
concerns.  Another challenge to improving diversity on the bench lies in the fact that 
“few states have systematic recruitment efforts to attract diverse judicial applicants.”11   
Beyond the problem posed by the type of selection process employed, many states 
do not use a transparent selection system. This lack of transparency contributes to a 
limited pool of applicants for judicial positions because lawyers are reticent to leave their 
practices to enter a system where both the application and the interview processes are 
unknown.12  Similarly, judicial salaries are well below those found in the private sector, 
particularly for minorities who are highly valued by their firms.  This substantial salary 
cut further limits the pool of quality female and minority candidates for judicial 
positions.13  Finally, there is the issue of politics in the selection process.  As the political 
                                                
4 TORES-SPELLISCY, supra note 2, at iv (Foreword). 
5 Id. 
6 Id.   
7 Id. 
8 FORSTER-LONG, LLC, AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 2 (2012). 
9 Mark Curriden, Tipping the Scales, A.B.A. J., July 1, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article 
/tipping_the_scales/.  
10 TORES-SPELLISCY, supra note 2, at iv.  
11 Id. at 2. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. at 5. 




pendulum swings, the prioritization of diversity on the bench is affected.  These are just a 
few of the challenges facing the efforts to ensure that our courts reflect the diverse make-
up of their constituencies.  
This article presumes that diverse and independent judiciaries are necessary and 
beneficial goals.  While it is important to understand these objectives, this article focuses 
on the current state of judicial selection in two particular states: South Carolina and 
Virginia.  Both of these states have a system of judicial selection that is unique only to 
them—one that is controlled exclusively by the state legislature, without input from any 
other branch of government.  Further, in South Carolina, the legislature serves as both the 
qualifying commission and the selecting entity. While on its face, a system with limited 
input would seem counterproductive to achieving diversity on the bench, when this 
system is compared to other states’ judicial selection process, exclusive legislative 
control has proven to be an effective method in attaining diversity.  This Article suggests 
reforms to this process to enhance further its ability to realize diversity in the judicial 
selection process. 
Part I of this article begins by examining judicial selection processes utilized 
generally by states, particularly the Missouri Plan. It continues by exploring the evolution 
of judicial selection in South Carolina and Virginia, ending with details about each state’s 
current judicial selection systems.  Part II compares and contrasts each state’s process in 
order to highlight the differences and evaluate how South Carolina and Virginia compare 
to other states in terms of diversity on the bench.  Part III analyzes the problems 
associated with the method of legislatively controlled judicial selection by reviewing a 
recent South Carolina Supreme Court case addressing judicial selection in that state.  
Finally, Part IV proposes reforms to the current systems utilized in each state, the 
employment of any one of which would be a meaningful step forward in depoliticizing 
judicial selection with the ultimate goal of achieving a more diverse bench.    
I. JUDICIAL SELECTION: GENERAL OVERVIEW: 
States employ a variety of different methods to choose their judges.  These 
methods include filling judicial posts by direct elections (either partisan or non-partisan), 
appointment by the governor with advice and consent of the state senate, or election by 
the state legislature. South Carolina and Virginia employ the latter method.14  Perhaps the 
most well known plan is the so-called Missouri Plan.15  This plan originated in Missouri 
in 1940 and has been adopted by several states, including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Iowa, and Florida to name a few.16     
The Missouri Plan is a non-partisan approach that incorporates different elements 
of the political system to select judges.17  Under the plan, a non-partisan qualifying 
commission proposes a list of names to the governor, who in turn has sixty days to decide 
whether to appoint a candidate from the list.18  If the governor fails to make a selection 
                                                
14 Methods of Judicial Selection, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.judicialselection.us 
/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
15 See Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 759 (2009). 
16 Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 14. 
17 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a). 
18 Id. 
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within sixty days, the commission may make the selection instead.19  After one year of 
service, the judge faces a retention vote during the general election by which voters 
decide whether to retain the judge for his or her full term.20  If the majority of voters vote 
against the judge, then the process begins all over again to fill the seat.21  
The composition of the commission is an important element in the Missouri Plan.  
The commission is comprised of lawyers proposed by the state bar association, citizens 
selected by the governor, and the chief justice of the state’s supreme court who acts as the 
chair of the commission.22 Interestingly, Iowa, a state that utilizes the Missouri Plan, 
includes an additional element of requiring a gender balance on the nominating 
commission.23  Further, the Missouri Plan includes voters as well, thereby incorporating 
different elements—the executive, the legislature, and voters—of the political process.   
By employing different components, the plan’s objective is to remove politics from the 
selection procedure while utilizing a “checks and balances” approach.  The use of a 
checks and balances approach is significant when compared to the approach to judicial 
selection in South Carolina and Virginia.  A system of checks and balances is at the heart 
of the separation of powers form of government adopted in the United States 
Constitution, which is also enshrined as a doctrine in all state constitutions.24  Separation 
of powers with clearly defined branches of government, each with its own separate and 
independent powers, ensures that no branch of government becomes more powerful than 
any other branch, thereby preventing an abuse of power.  The lack of any system a checks 
and balance would allow the legislative branch to exert too much power over the judicial 
branch, creating a threat to the separation of powers.  
The Missouri Plan is not without its critics, however.  Some of these criticisms 
include that there is too much influence by lawyers,25 too much politics in the process, 
and that there is a conspicuous lack of diversity on the nominating commission, which 
translates into a lack of diversity on the bench.26 As Professor Stephen J. Ware points out, 
the Missouri Plan may not be the panacea many hope.27 Missouri ranks thirty-second in 
terms of diversity on the bench in comparison to other states.28 Professor Ware, in his 
article, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, places states on a continuum in terms 
of “elitism” based on the amount of influence exerted by bar associations in the judicial 
selection process.29 Missouri ranks in the second highest tier in terms of “More Elitist, 
High Bar Control,” while South Carolina and Virginia are in the second to last tier in 
terms of elitism, outpaced only by states with pure contestable elections.30 Some of the 
other states mentioned above that utilize the Missouri Plan for judicial selection are as 
geographically diverse as Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida.31 Interestingly, Alaska 
                                                
19 Id. 
20 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1). 
21 Id. 
22 MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(d). 
23 IA. STAT. § 46.3. 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I-III. 
25 See Ware, supra note 15, at 759.   
26 See TORES-SPELLISCY, supra note 2, at 6. 
27 See Ware, supra note 15, at 759.  
28 See infra Appendix A. 
29 Ware, supra note 15, at 755. 
30 Id. at 775. 
31 Id. at 759. 




ranks fortieth in terms of diversity, Arizona is tied for twenty-first, Colorado is 
fourteenth, and Florida ranks twelfth.32   
Additionally, critics of the Missouri Plan note that it increasingly injects politics into 
judicial selection through its use of retention elections. The survival of a judge may 
depend on whether or not his or her decisions are popular with voters. Even more so, 
survival may depend on whether a judge is in the “right party” at the time of the election 
rather than whether a judge’s decisions are correct under the law.33 Therefore, perhaps 
there is another system of judicial selection available to address the criticisms directed at 
the Missouri Plan which may in fact be better suited to achieve the objectives of a more 
diverse and independent judiciary, especially when employing “tweaks” to that system as 
proposed in this Article.    
A. South Carolina 
1. Overview 
The population of South Carolina is 66.1% Caucasian, 27.9% African American, 
1.3% Asian, and 5.1% Hispanic ethnicity (independent of racial classification).34 Women 
make up 51.3% of the state’s population.35 Like all other states, South Carolina’s 
judiciary consists of several levels, beginning with the highest court, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court.36 The Supreme Court is made up of five elected justices,37 and each 
serves a ten-year term.38 The court consists of a Chief Justice and four associate 
justices.39 The terms are staggered so that the legislature elects one member of the court 
every two years,40 and a justice may be re-elected to any number of terms.41 The court 
acts in an appellate capacity, which includes cases on certiorari from the South Carolina 
Court of Appeals and seven classes of appeals directly from circuit and family court cases 
that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court.42   
The second highest court in the state, the Court of Appeals, is comprised of nine 
judges.43  The nine judges of the Court of Appeals are arranged and elected by seat,44 and 
candidates can be from any geographic region in the state.45 Each member of the Court of 
                                                
32 See infra Appendix A. 
33 Ware, supra note 15, at 772.  
34 See 2010 Census Interactive Population Search – SC, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov 
/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=45 (last visited June 6, 2013). 
35 Id. 
36 South Carolina courts include Probate Courts and Magistrate Courts; however, these are not addressed in 
this article because the process of judicial selection is different from legislative appointment. 




41 Id. The South Carolina Constitution is void of any mention of term limits for Supreme Court justices. See 
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
42 These classes include the following: cases involving the sentence of death; cases involving the 
constitutionality of state law or local ordinances; cases pertaining to elections; and appeals of family court 
orders related to abortion by a minor. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-8-200 (2012). 
43 § 14-8-10; see also Court of Appeals, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/appeals/ (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
44 § 14-8-20. 
45 How Judges Are Elected in South Carolina, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us 
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Appeals is elected to six-year terms, which are also staggered.46 The court consists of a 
Chief Judge and eight associate judges who hear cases in panels of three or en banc.47 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals covers questions of law and equity arising from the 
circuit and family courts except those seven classes noted above which are the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court.48   
The second largest branch of the judiciary in the state is the circuit court system. 
The General Assembly elects forty-six circuit court judges from the sixteen judicial 
circuits and thirteen circuit court judges from the state at-large for six-year terms.49 The 
South Carolina circuit courts sit either as the Court of Common Pleas (civil cases) or as 
the Court of General Sessions (criminal cases).50   
In addition to the circuit courts there is also a system of family courts. Similar to 
other judges discussed above, family court judges are elected by a joint public vote of the 
General Assembly.51  At least two family court judges are elected for six-year terms to 
each of the sixteen judicial circuits, with fifty-two judges who rotate primarily from 
county to county within their resident circuits.52  Jurisdiction of the family court is 
limited to domestic or family relations and cases involving juvenile-minors under the age 
of seventeen.53  
South Carolina’s court system is structured like many other states with the bulk of 
cases being heard on the circuit court and family court levels.  With an understanding of 
the court system in place, it is important to understand how South Carolina came to its 
current process of judicial selection.   
a. A Brief History of the Election of Judges in South Carolina 
 South Carolina has always been, and continues to be, a strong legislative state.54  
Since 1776, the General Assembly has enjoyed unfettered control over the election of 
justices and judges. The state’s prior constitutions of 1776, 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865, and 
1868 are all consistent with respect to the General Assembly’s plenary control over the 
election process.55  Under the 1895 constitution and until 1997, this legislative dominance 
continued virtually unaltered.56  However, the passage of a 1997 constitutional 
amendment57 led to the establishment of the Judicial Merit Selection Committee, an 
independent body exclusively charged with determining which three judicial candidates’ 
                                                                                                                                            
/judges/howjudgeselected.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).  
46 S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
47 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-8-80; see also Court of Appeals, supra note 43. 
48 § 14-8-200.  
49 See § 14-5-610; Circuit Court, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/circuitCourt/ (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2013).  
50 See Circuit Court, supra note 49. 
51 S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80 (providing for the Judicial Merit Selection Commission to nominate 
candidates to be elected by the General Assembly to the family court, among other courts).  
52 See Family Court, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/familyCourt/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-3-30, 63-3-40, 63-3-320. 
53 S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-510. 
54 See COLE BLEASE GRAHAM, JR., THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 46 (2007). 
55 See infra Part I.A.1.b. 
56 See infra Part I.A.1.b 
57 South Carolina Constitution article V (“The Judicial Department”) was amended by House Bill 3063 to 
add Section 27 (“Judicial Merit Selection Commission”).  Act of June 4, 1997, 1997 S.C. Acts 76. 




names will be submitted to the General Assembly. The General Assembly, in turn, is now 
constitutionally limited to choosing only among the three candidates submitted by the 
commission.58  The merit selection system presently used in South Carolina differs 
significantly from both a popular election system and a system based on executive 
appointment, as well as from a true merit-based selection process.59   
b. South Carolina’s Past Constitutions 
Between the years 1776 and 1895, South Carolina was governed by six constitutions:  
The constitutions of 1776, 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865, and 1868.60  Provisions from the 
antebellum constitutions of 1776,61 1778,62 and 179063 concerning the election of judicial 
officers (other than justices of the peace)64 are virtually identical, and all three provide for 
election by joint vote of both houses of the state legislature. However, the two Civil War 
era constitutions of 1861 and 1865 differ with respect to the joint vote.65  Finally, the 
Reconstruction era constitution of 1868 contains two provisions calling for election by a 
joint legislative vote.66  Without exception, the power to elect judges rested exclusively 
with the legislature from the years 1776 until 1895. 
                                                
58 See infra Part I.A.1.c. 
59 “Known as either the Missouri Plan or the A.B.A. Plan, the merit system was first formulated by 
Professor Albert Kales for the American Judicature Society in 1914.” Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South 
Carolina’s Experiment: Legislative Control of Judicial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1217, 1224-25 
(1998) (citing Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure—Its Historical 
Development, in JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE: SELECTED READINGS 29, 30–31 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 
1973)). 
60 See GRAHAM, supra note 54, at 10 (“South Carolina adopted its first state constitution March 26, 1776.  
Since then, it has formally had six more (1778, 1790, 1861, 1865, 1868, and 1895).”). The 1861 
constitution is included, although some scholars debate whether it should be counted as a separate 
constitution to the extent that “the existing provisions for internal governance were not changed 
significantly.” Id. at 16. 
61 The 1776 constitution provides “[t]hat all other judicial officers shall be chosen by ballot, jointly by the 
general assembly and legislative council, and except the judges of the court of chancery, commissioned by 
the president and commander-in-chief, during good behavior, but shall be removed on address of the 
general assembly and legislative council.” S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XX, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc01.asp. 
62 The 1778 constitution provides “[t]hat all other judicial officers shall be chosen by ballot jointly by the 
senate and house of representatives, and, except the judges of the court of chancery, commissioned by the 
governor and commander-in-chief during good behavior, but shall be removed on address of the senate and 
house of representatives.” S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXVII, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc02.asp. 
63 The 1790 constitution provides that “[t]he judges of the superior courts . . . shall be elected by the joint 
ballot of both houses in the house of representatives.” S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, § 1, reprinted in THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 18 (1976) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]. 
64 A justice of the peace, as used in the prior South Carolina constitutions, is similar to modern-day 
magistrates in South Carolina. Cf. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 26 (“The Governor, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, shall appoint a number of magistrates for each county as provided by law.”). 
65 Compare S.C. CONST. of 1861, art. VI, § 1, available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/southcar/south.html 
(“The Judges of the Superior Courts . . . shall be elected by the joint ballot of both Houses, in the House of 
Representatives.”), with S.C. CONST. of 1865, art. III, § 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 63, at 
44 (“The judges of the superior courts shall be elected by the general assembly . . . .”). 
66 See S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 63, at 56 (“[The Chief 
Justice and two Associate Justices] shall be elected by a joint vote of the General Assembly . . . .”); S.C. 
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c. The 1895 Constitution and the 1997 Reforms 
 White farmers of the up-country supported Tillman’s call for a constitutional 
convention; the result was the 1895 Constitution.67  As expected, the 1895 constitution 
continued the election of judicial candidates by a joint vote of the General Assembly.68  
Election of justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the circuit courts were originally 
provided for in article V, sections 3 and 13, respectively.69  In 1985, section 8 was added 
to article V to address the election of judges of the new court of appeals.70  Prior to 1997, 
an eight-member joint committee of the General Assembly functioned as a type of merit 
commission.71  But the process of judicial selection suffered from some noteworthy 
defects.72  The two most obvious defects included a dearth of objective criteria with 
which legislators could evaluate a candidate, and the public perception that the General 
Assembly simply elected those whom it knew best, i.e., former or sitting legislators.73  
The calls for change were loud,74 and the subsequent reforms were real.75 
 The 1997 reforms were substantial because they banned sitting legislators from 
running for a judicial office and vested nomination power exclusively in the new Judicial 
Merit Selection Commission (JMSC).  The JMSC is constituted as such: 
 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Judicial Merit Selection Commission shall consist of the 
following individuals:  
                                                                                                                                            
CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 11, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 63, at 56 (“All vacancies in the 
Supreme Court or other inferior tribunals shall be filled by election as herein prescribed . . . .”).  
67 GRAHAM, supra note 54, at 33-35.  
68 See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“The members of the Supreme Court shall be elected by a joint public vote 
of the General Assembly . . . .”).  
69 S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“Election of the members of the Supreme Court”); S.C. CONST. art V, § 13 
(“Judicial circuits”). 
70 S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8 (“Election of members of Court of Appeals”). 
71 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-10 to -60. 
72 See, e.g., Driggers, supra note 59, at 1227 (noting legislators “were able to elect any constitutionally 
qualified candidate without regard to the General Assembly’s own standards for competency”); see also 
Kevin Eberle, Judicial Selection in South Carolina: Who Gets to Judge?, S.C. LAW., May-June 2002, at 20, 
22 (“[T]he public became increasingly vocal about the perception that judges were being selected based on 
the good-old-boy system.”). 
73 See Driggers, supra note 59, at 1227 (“The public perceived that the General Assembly too often elected 
those [whom] it knew best—sitting or former legislators.”); see also Cindi Ross Scoppe, High-Level 
Reformers Want to Change Way S.C. Selects Judges, THE STATE, Feb. 16, 1994, at B5 (noting that, in 1994, 
all Supreme Court justices and over one-half of circuit court judges had at one point served in the General 
Assembly). 
74 See Driggers, supra note 59, at 1228 (“Both citizens and legislators were quick to denounce the 
perceived inbreeding of South Carolina’s judicial selection system.”) (citing Chad Jenkins, Letter to the 
Editor, Judicial Selection: State’s System Clearly Falls Short, THE STATE, Mar. 4, 1996, at A8; James 
“Bubba” Cromer, Editorial, Fairness, Merit Must Be Part of Judicial Selection Process, THE STATE, Apr. 
21, 1995, at A17); Cindi Ross Scoppe, Legislature Overhauls Judiciary, Third Pillar of Reforms Set, THE 
STATE, May 30, 1996, at A1 (“A tradition of cronyism, based on political connections rather than 
competence, was firmly entrenched in state law and custom.”). 
75 See Driggers, supra note 59, at 1230 (“The new Act changes how South Carolina elects its judges in two 
significant ways . . . .”). 




(1) Five members appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and of these appointments:  
  (a) Three members must be serving members of the 
General Assembly; and  
  (b) Two members must be selected from the public,  
(2) three members appointed by the Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and two members appointed by the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and of these 
appointments:  
  (a) Three members must be serving members of the 
General Assembly; and  
  (b) Two members must be selected from the public.76 
d. The JMSC:  Functions and Membership 
1. Functions 
Title 2, Chapter 19 of the South Carolina code details the JMSC’s powers and 
duties.77   The most significant of these include: (1) publicizing judicial vacancies;78 (2) 
soliciting the Bar’s assessment of candidates;79 (3) holding public hearings regarding a 
candidate’s qualifications;80 (4) evaluating candidates based upon a non-exhaustive list of 
nine categories;81 (5) considering a candidate’s race, gender, national origin, and other 
demographic factors;82 (6) administering oaths, taking depositions, and issuing 
subpoenas;83 (7) ensuring candidates are neither sitting legislators nor former legislators, 
who have been out of the General Assembly for less than one year;84 (8) submitting no 
more than three candidates’ names for one seat and no fewer than three unless the 
Commission explains itself to the General Assembly in writing;85 (9) screening retired 
justices and judges on whom the Chief Justice might call to sit to hear certain cases;86 
and, (10) selecting members to serve on various Citizens Committees, whose task 
includes advising the Commission about a particular candidate, pursuant to rules 
established by the Commission.87 
In evaluating a candidate’s qualifications, the JMSC considers the following, non-
exhaustive list of nine categories: (1) constitutional qualifications; (2) ethical fitness; (3) 
professional and academic ability; (4) character; (5) reputation; (6) physical health; (7) 
mental stability; (8) experience; and, (9) judicial temperament.88 
                                                
76 S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10(B) (2012). 
77 § 2-19-10. 
78 § 2-19-20. 
79 § 2-19-25. 
80 § 2-19-30.  
81 § 2-19-35. 
82 § 2-19-35. 
83 § 2-19-60. 
84 § 2-19-70. 
85 § 2-19-80. 
86 § 2-19-100. 
87 § 2-19-120. 
88 These nine categories are listed in § 2-19-35(A). 





Although close to a “true” merit-based selection system, the JMSC fails in one 
important regard: sitting legislators dominate its membership.89 According to the 
American Judicature Society, a true merit system includes the following three necessary 
elements: “1) a commission comprised of both lay and lawyer members to recruit, screen, 
investigate and evaluate judicial candidates; 2) nomination to the appointing authority of 
a limited number of candidates; and 3) appointment by the governor or other appointing 
authority.”90 “The logic behind merit selection is as follows: Most judicial selection 
systems involve politics; politics is bad; ergo, judicial selection systems without politics 
will yield ‘good’ judges.”91  However, politics and judicial elections are inseparable, for 
“[t]he process of picking a person to be a judge is woven into the political fabric and is, 
by any definition, a political process.”92 The key consideration then becomes how much 
politics is too much. 
B. Virginia 
1. Overview 
According to recent census data, Virginia has approximately eight million people, 
of whom 68.6% are Caucasian, 19.4% are African American, 5.5% are Asian, 
approximately 3.2% are other and almost 3% are “two or more races”.93  The population 
is 7.9% Hispanic ethnicity, which is independent of racial classification.94  The 
Commonwealth is 50.9% female and 49.1% male.95 Virginia’s judicial system is 
comprised of three levels of courts: appellate, trial, and limited jurisdiction courts.96 
These levels consist of five jurisdictionally distinct courts: the supreme court, the court of 
                                                
89 The ideal commission consists of seven members: three lawyers chosen by the state bar association, three 
members of the general public chosen by the governor of the state, and one sitting judge who serves as the 
chairman.  See Driggers supra note 59, at 1225. 
90 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS, Introduction (1993).  
As of March 2013, the following ten individuals constitute the JMSC’s membership:  (1) Sen. Larry A. 
Martin; (2) Sen. Floyd Nicholson; (3) Sen. George E. “Chip” Campsen, III; (4) Joseph Preston “Pete” 
Strom Jr.; (5) Kristian M. Cross; (6) Rep. Alan D. Clemmons; (7) Rep. David J. Mack, III; (8) Rep. Bruce 
W. Bannister; (9) John Davis Harrell, Esq.; and (10) H. Donald Sellers, Esq. See Judicial Merit Selection 
Commission Members, S.C. LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/JMSCMembersMarch2013.pdf (last visited June 6, 2013). 
The membership of the JMSC has mostly remained the same since Segars-Andrews v. JMSC was decided. 
What has not changed is legislators comprising the majority of the JMSC.  The presence of legislators on 
the JMSC necessarily makes the JMSC a political body, an effect that wholly defeats the rationale behind a 
merit-based selection system.  Segars-Andrews v. JMSC is a case involving a sitting family court judge 
who was deemed “unfit” to be re-appointed to her seat.  The case is discussed at length infra Part III.A.  
91 Driggers supra note 59, at 1224. 
92 Daniel J. Meador, Some Yins and Yangs of Our Judicial System, 66 A.B.A. J. 122, 122 (1980). 
93 See 2010 Census Interactive Population Search – VA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=51 (last visited June 6, 2013). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 




appeals, the circuit courts, the general district courts, and the juvenile and domestic 
relations district courts.97 
The Supreme Court of Virginia possesses both original and appellate jurisdiction, 
with its primary function being review of decisions of the lower courts, including 
decisions of the court of appeals.98 The court consists of seven justices who serve for 
terms of twelve years.99  The Court of Appeals of Virginia provides appellate review of 
final decisions of the circuit courts in domestic relations matters, appeals from decisions 
of an administrative agency, traffic infractions, and criminal cases.100  The eleven judges 
of the court of appeals serve for terms of eight years and sit in panels of at least three 
judges, and membership on the panel is rotated.101  The only trial court of general 
jurisdiction in Virginia is the circuit courts.102  The judges of the circuit courts also serve 
for terms of eight years.103 Virginia’s unified district court system consists of the general 
district court and the juvenile and domestic relations district courts.104  Judges of the 
general district courts and judges of the juvenile and domestic relations courts serve for 
terms of six years.105 
a. A Brief History of the Election of Judges in Virginia 
In Virginia, judges are selected for the bench by a process of legislative election.  
Like South Carolina, Virginia also has had several constitutions, including the original 
constitution adopted in 1776.  There were six subsequent major revisions in 1830, 1851, 
1864, 1869, 1902, and, most recently, 1971.106  Interestingly, not all of these constitutions 
are consistent with respect to the General Assembly’s plenary control over the election 
process of judges.107  Under the 1851 constitution, and until 1870, the state reverted to 
election of judges by popular vote.108  However, the passage of the 1870 constitution 
reestablished selection of the judiciary by the General Assembly in the state, reverting 
judicial selection to a process of exclusive legislative control.109   
An important contrast to South Carolina’s constitutional history is that Virginia has 
never adopted a provision similar to the 1997 South Carolina constitutional amendment 
establishing an “independent” body exclusively charged with determining which judicial 
candidates are qualified for submission to the General Assembly.  This constitutional 
change led to the creation of the Judicial Merit Selection Commission in South 
                                                
97 Id. (establishing the foundation for the judiciary as set forth by General Assembly); VA. CODE ANN. § 
17.1-300 (2012) (supreme court); §17.1-400 (court of appeals); § 17.1-500 (circuit courts); § 16.1-69.5 
(general district, juvenile, and domestic relations courts). 
98 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
99 VA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 7. 
100 See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-405; § 17.1-406. 
101 §§ 17.1-400(A), -402(B). 
102 § 17.1-513. 
103 VA. CONST., art. VI, § 7. 
104 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.7. 
105 § 16.1-69.9. 
106 THE HORNBOOK OF VIRGINIA HISTORY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE OLD DOMINION’S PEOPLE, PLACES, 
AND PAST 95-98 (Emily J. Salmon & Edward D.C. Campbell, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter VIRGINIA 
HISTORY]. 
107 See infra Part I.B.1.b. 
108 See infra Part I.B.1.b. 
109 VA. CONST., art. VI, § 7. 
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Carolina.110 Virginia’s lack of a qualifying commission is an interesting and significant 
difference between the only two states that employ a selection process exclusively 
controlled by the legislature.   It would seem that in order to qualify truly as a “merit” 
system, the process of judicial selection would need to incorporate some element of 
actual qualifications.  Thus, the lack of any qualifying commission, much less a 
diversified one, places Virginia's selection process in a unique category.  Virginia's 
system is one with complete legislative control with little or no outside influence or 
considerations.   
b. Virginia’s Past Constitutions 
Virginia’s constitutional changes reflect various power struggles occurring in the 
Commonwealth—and in the country—over its long history.  The 1776 Virginia 
Constitution, adopted shortly after the Declaration of Independence, limited the right to 
vote in the state to the wealthy and to landowners, effectively concentrating power in the 
hands of a few.111 As discontent grew between farmers in the western part of the state, 
who owned and cultivated their own land, and wealthy slave-owners in the east, a 
constitutional convention was called in 1829.  One of the key issues at the convention 
was concern about representation in the legislature and who had the right to vote.112  
Ultimately, members of the convention reached a resolution and adopted a new 
constitution, giving the western counties only a slightly larger proportion of legislative 
seats.113  Discontent between the westerners and wealthy easterners continued.114   
As tensions in the country grew over the issue of slavery, mistrust and hostility 
persisted between the two divisions of populations in Virginia.115 The legislature called 
another constitutional convention in 1851 in the wake of the 1840 census.116  The 
alterations made to the 1851 constitution changed the Virginia political system to a 
system of popular election.  This included popular election for the governor, the newly 
created office of lieutenant governor, and all Virginia judges.117  It was a dramatic 
alteration from the prior system, in which the top two state officers were elected by the 
legislature and the judges were appointed.118  This marked a significant, albeit brief, 
change in judicial selection in Virginia. 
The Virginia legislature adopted, without a popular vote, the 1864 constitution 
after the legislature voted for secession from the Union.119  The legitimacy of this 
                                                
110 See supra Part I.A. 
111 See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 97; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights §6, available at 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-1776.htm (“and that all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent 
common interest with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage”). 
112 See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 41. 
113 See id.  
114 See id. (discussing westerners’ calls for more representation). 
115 See id. 
116 See generally id. at 41-42. 
117 See VA. CONST. of 1851, art. VI, available at http://vagovernmentmatters.org/archive/files 
/vaconstitution1851_ded45111de.pdf. 
118 See VA. CONST. of 1851.  
119 See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 46. 




constitution has been questioned in light of its creation and adoption during wartime and 
without ratification by voters.120   
The 1870 constitution marked a stark contrast to the 1864 constitution.  The 
changes adopted after the Civil War included the right to vote by all men over the age of 
21, including freedmen.121  Importantly, the 1870 constitution incorporated the provisions 
of the 1864 constitution, which had returned the process of judicial selection to the 
General Assembly.122  Unlike the 1864 constitution, the 1870 constitution was ratified by 
a popular vote.123  Following 1864 and the post-Civil War/Reconstruction era of the 1870 
constitution, the 1902 constitution reflected the ideas of racial segregation and the 
adoption of Jim Crow laws throughout the South, including Virginia.124  These changes 
were an attempt to marginalize or eliminate the Black vote, which came about earlier in 
the post-Civil War era.125    
Ultimately, the latest revision to the Virginia constitution in 1971 replaced the 
1902 constitution.  This constitution broadly reflected the principles of the civil rights 
movement in the United States.126  The 1971 constitution included the right to vote for all 
men and women, regardless of color, and reaffirmed the judicial selection system that had 
been in place since the constitution of 1864, (i.e., through legislative appointment).127  
The 1971 constitution is the most current constitution in Virginia, and more importantly, 
it reflects the current state of judicial selection in the Commonwealth. 
c. Current System 
Under the current system of judicial selection, once a vacancy occurs or a new 
seat is created by the General Assembly, the Virginia Supreme Court advises the General 
Assembly with regard to the circuit courts and appellate courts as to whether or not a 
vacancy should be filled.128  Additionally, the Committee on District Courts also advises 
the General Assembly regarding vacancies on the district level.129  This certification 
process to fill the vacancies is primarily based on caseload statistics.130  However, while 
this certification process is not binding on the legislature, it is required for district court 
vacancies prior to filling.131 
“Once the vacancy is ‘certified’ by the appropriate body, the House and Senate 
Committees for Courts of Justice begin taking nominations from General Assembly 
members.”132 However, the Senate’s rules require all senators—both Republican and 
                                                
120 See VA. CONST. Foreward, n. 1, available at http://legis.state.va.us/Laws/search/ConstOfVa.pdf; Leroy 
Rountree Hassell, Sr., The Evolution of Virginia’s Constitutions: A Celebration of the Rule of Law in 
America, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2007). 
121 See VA. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 1. 
122 See VA. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, §§ 5, 11, 13. 
123 See VIRGINIA HISTORY, supra note 106, at 98. 
124 See id. at 63-64. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 98. 
127 See generally VA. CONST. of 1971. 
128 See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-511. 
129 See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.9:3. 
130 See Judicial Selection Overview, COMMW. OF VA. DIV. OF LEGIS. SERVS., 
http://dls.virginia.gov/judicial.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
131 See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.9:3. 
132 Judicial Selection Overview, supra note 130. 
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Democrat—representing each circuit to unanimously nominate a candidate for each 
vacancy or new seat.133  Typically, that person is supported on the floor by the rest of the 
senators.134  In the event that the circuit senators do not nominate anyone, any senator 
may make a nomination on the floor.135  The Committees then determine whether each 
individual is qualified for the judgeship sought.136  Following the Courts Committee’s 
determination of qualification, a report listing qualified candidates is made to each house 
of the General Assembly.137  The House and Senate vote separately, and the candidate 
receiving a plurality of votes in each house is elected to the vacant judgeship or new 
seat.138  Incumbent judges standing for election to a subsequent term must go through the 
same process.139  The election does not require action by the Governor.140 
II. COMPARISONS BETWEEN SOUTH CAROLINA AND VIRGINIA 
One cannot fully appreciate the issue of diversity on the court without a 
conversation involving statistics. Statistics is the study of the collection, organization, 
analysis, and interpretation of data. Statistics also provides tools for prediction and 
forecasting using this data.  However, statistics and the data can be manipulated.  
Therefore, a thorough explanation and understanding of what is being measured and how 
it is measured is necessary so as not to draw improper conclusions from the collection of 
data.   
In South Carolina, it appears that the appellate courts are extremely diverse in 
their current makeup.  The South Carolina Supreme Court has a current composition of 
two female justices and one African American justice out of a total of five justices 
overall.141  As a result, South Carolina’s Supreme Court is 40% female and 20% African 
American.  Additionally, it appears that the Court of Appeals is diverse as well, with two 
                                                
133 See A Legislator’s Guide to the Judicial Selection Process, VA. DIV. OF LEGIS. SERVS., 





138  Judicial Selection Overview, supra note 130. This process has been described further in a recent bill 
amending §17.1-100.1 of the Virginia code. H.B. 745, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (“The 
Supreme Court shall develop and implement a weighted caseload system to precisely measure and compare 
judicial caseloads throughout the Commonwealth on the circuit court, general district court, and juvenile 
and domestic relations district court levels. The system shall include the development of a comprehensive 
workload model, an objective means of determining the need for judicial positions, an assessment of the 
optimum distribution of judicial positions throughout the Commonwealth, and a recommended plan for the 
realignment of the circuit and district boundaries. The Supreme Court shall report to the General Assembly 
by November 15, 2013, on the weighted caseload in each court in each county and city, and in each circuit 
and district based on the current circuit and district boundaries. The report shall include the current number 
of judges assigned to each court in each county and city. The Court shall also recommend a plan for the 
realignment of the circuit and district boundaries and the number of judges the Court recommends for 
assignment to each court in each county and city within the new circuits and districts.”) 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Judges by Gender and Race, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF S.C., http://lwvsc.org/files/race 
_and_gender_chart_1_.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).  




female judges and one African American judge out of nine total judges.142 Thus, the 
South Carolina Court of Appeals is 22% female and 11% African American.  
As stated earlier, a broader look at all courts in the state suggests the circuit or 
lower level courts do not statistically reflect the demographics of the state. On the circuit 
court level, which has jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases and where the 
majority of litigants appear, South Carolina has only four African American judges and 
five female judges out of a total of forty-six judges.143 By way of illustration, in 2010, the 
circuit courts in South Carolina handled approximately 232,000 cases.144 The appellate 
courts—the court of appeals and the supreme court combined—handled approximately 
3100 cases, or 1.3% percent of the number handled at the trial level.145  Thus, while it 
may appear that South Carolina is achieving some measure of diversity based on the 
statistical makeup of the appellate courts in the state, the appearance of diversity is more 
pronounced on the appellate level than on the circuit level, which is where most litigants 
appear. The statistics for Virginia’s courts are similar.  In 2009, the Virginia trial level 
courts handled approximately 4.1 million cases,146 while the appellate courts combined 
resolved approximately 5200 cases or .13% of the trial court cases.147 Nonetheless, it is 
instructive to compare statistically how South Carolina and Virginia compare to the other 
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia based on diversity, as well as against each 
other.   
According to the American Bar Association’s database on diversity in state 
courts, as of 2010, the racial diversity of the judiciary in South Carolina was 9%.148  In 
Virginia, the racial diversity of its judiciary was 11%.149  By way of comparison, 
Georgia, which employs a system of non-partisan popular election of judges, had a 
composition of 11% of a racially diverse judiciary.150  California, which employs a 
system of election by the General Assembly with confirmation from a committee of 
individuals who are not legislators, has a diversity composition of 23%.151  Ohio utilizes a 
system of partisan primary selection followed by a nonpartisan general election.152  Ohio 
has a diversity composition of 4%.153  In New Mexico, where judges are selected by 
partisan election,154 the diversity composition of the judiciary is 30%.155  However, in 
                                                
142 Id. 
143 Id.  Judges Jefferson and Lee are counted in both statistics as female and African-American. Id. 
144 State Court Caseload Statistics, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx (follow “Civil and Criminal– National Caseloads” hyperlink) 
[hereinafter Trial Caseloads] (last visited June 6, 2012). 
145 State Court Caseload Statistics, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx (follow “Appellate – Grand Total Court Caseloads” hyperlink) 
[hereinafter Appellate Caseloads] (last visited June 6, 2012). 
146 Trial Caseloads, supra note 144. 
147 Appellate Caseloads, supra note 145. 
148 National Database on Judicial Diversity in State Courts, A.B.A., http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/jd 




152 See Judicial Selection in the States: Ohio, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=OH (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
153 National Database, supra note 148. 
154 See Judicial Selection in the States: New Mexico, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=NM (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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Illinois, which also uses partisan elections to select judges,156 the diversity composition is 
14%.157 
Assuming again that diversity on the bench is a worthy objective, the conclusion 
to be drawn is that there is no system that outpaces the others in achieving greater 
diversity on the bench.  Factors such as diversity of the state population play an important 
role.  For example, in Hawaii, which utilizes a system of General Assembly election from 
a nominating committee with senate confirmation,158 but with a high percentage of 
minorities in the state, the judiciary has a diversity composition of 67%.159  Clearly, this 
is not to say that the judicial selection process in Hawaii is better suited to create a more 
diverse judiciary.  So where does the answer to the question of how best to achieve 
diversity on the bench lie?   
We now return to South Carolina and Virginia.  Given the statistical data above, 
with 9% and 11% diversity compositions of the judiciary respectively, this ranks South 
Carolina twenty-first and Virginia fourteenth out of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.160  In contrast, Missouri is thirty-second out of fifty.161  Other states that 
utilize the Missouri Plan and their ranks are as follows: Alaska ranks fortieth;162 Arizona, 
tied with South Carolina, ranks twenty-first;163 Florida ranks twelfth;164 and Iowa, which 
includes a requirement of gender diversity on its commission, ranks thirty-sixth.165  As 
shown, South Carolina and Virginia, while utilizing a system of judicial selection that is 
controlled exclusively by one branch of government without input or inclusion of other 
branches, appear to perform well against other systems in achieving the goal of diversity 
on the bench, including when compared to the lauded Missouri Plan. 
There are important differences in the processes in South Carolina and Virginia 
however.  South Carolina’s use of the JMSC, which has a statutory requirement of being 
comprised of a majority of sitting legislators, but includes four non-legislators, has led to 
criticism of South Carolina’s system for lacking checks and balances.  Conversely, the 
use of the JMSC has led to credit for the state’s adoption of a qualifying commission, 
which furthers the idea of a merit system.166  The inclusion of a checks and balances 
approach is clearly present in the Missouri Plan, which utilizes a non-partisan 
commission in addition to legislative, gubernatorial, and voter input in the process. An 
additional criticism of the South Carolina system is the statutory requirement that 
legislators comprise a majority of the JSMC, which results in sitting legislators in South 
                                                                                                                                            
155 National Database, supra note 148. 
156 See Judicial Selection in the States: Illinois, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=IL (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
157 National Database, supra note 148. 
158 See Judicial Selection in the States: Hawaii, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=HI (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
159 National Database, supra note 148. 






166 See Larry O'Dell, Critics Target Virginia Judge Selection Process, PILOTONLINE.COM (March 20, 2009), 
http://hamptonroads.com/2009/03/critics-target-virginias-judge-selection-process. 




Carolina acting as both the “qualifiers” and the “selectors” of the judges.167  In contrast, 
Virginia’s selection process is criticized for not using any qualifying commission, but 
instead using a system in which a legislative committee acts as the qualifiers with no 
outside interests represented.168  This criticism also goes to the issue of a lack of a checks 
and balances system in Virginia by vesting complete, unfettered control in the 
legislature.169   
 Another important concern is that of judicial independence.  How is 
independence to be measured?  A recent court decision in South Carolina sheds light on 
the issue of judicial selection and independence of judges and, more particularly, on the 
issue of politics in the judicial selection process in a state that employs an exclusive 
legislature-controlled system.  Politics and judicial elections are inseparable, for, as 
Professor Daniel Meador observes, “the process of picking a person to be a judge is 
woven into the political fabric and is, by any definition, a political process.”170  The key 
consideration then becomes how much politics is too much. 
III. SEGARS-ANDREWS V. JMSC: WHAT IT TEACHES 
A. Factual Background 
On July 30, 2004, Mr. Simpson brought a divorce action in Clarendon County 
Family Court between Mr. Simpson and his wife.171 There was no true adversary 
proceeding, as Mrs. Simpson “had been induced to sign a [pro se answer] at the time the 
complaint was filed.”172 The answer she filed was drafted by her husband’s lawyer.173 
“Under the Agreement, Mrs. Simpson gave up claims to substantial marital assets . . . but 
[the Agreement] was later challenged by Mrs. Simpson for various reasons, including 
issues pertaining to her competence to enter into the Agreement in light of her ‘medical 
disorders and medications’. . . .”174  Family Court Judge McFadden agreed with Mrs. 
Simpson and held the agreement to be invalid.175   
                                                
167 Brief of League of Women Voters of S.C. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Segars-Andrews 
v. JMSC, 691 S.E.2d 453 (S.C. 2010), [hereinafter League Brief] available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/news/Amicus_Brief_South_Carolina_32CD4C5A3D6EE.pdf. 
168 O’Dell, supra note 166. 
169 Id. 
170 Meador, supra note 92, at 122. 
171 See JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMM., REPORT OF A CANDIDATES QUALIFICATIONS: THE HONORABLE 
F.P. “CHARLIE” SEGARS-ANDREWS, FAMILY COURT, NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SEAT 1 24 (2008) 
[hereinafter JMSC REPORT], available at 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/FinalSegarsAndrewsCharlie.pdf. 
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 25. Professor John P. Freeman elaborates on why he went into so much detail about the agreement 
in the Judicial Merit Selection Commission report on the Segars-Andrews case: “I call attention to the 
background concerning the Agreement between the parties in Simpson II because, in my opinion, had the 
Agreement not been executed and later challenged and then thrown out by Judge McFadden, Mr. 
Simpson[’s] attack on Judge Segars-Andrews qualifications matter would not have arisen. I say this 
because, in my opinion, absent that Agreement, the split between husband and wife in Simpson II would 
have been 60:40 in the husband’s favor, with each side paying their own fees. Had this occurred, I doubt 
Mr. Simpson[] would have raised any complaint about the judge’s fairness.” Id. 
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“By the time Judge Segars-Andrews came on the scene, the Agreement, created 
on behalf of Mr. Simpson to eliminate his wife’s rights to substantial marital assets, had 
already been set aside.”176  Segars-Andrews ruled only on custody, child support, 
visitation, equitable division, and attorney’s fees and costs.177  On April 12, 2006, Mr. 
Simpson filed a motion to disqualify Segars-Andrews from presiding over the divorce 
action.178  His complaint was based upon Segars-Andrews’ husband’s law partner having 
rendered an affidavit in support of the fee petition submitted by the attorneys who 
represented Mr. Simpson’s mother in her divorce approximately fourteen months prior to 
Mr. Simpson’s divorce action.179 On April 14, 2006, Segars-Andrews initially denied Mr. 
Simpson’s motion, but she then, sua sponte, decided to recuse herself when she 
discovered that Mr. Simpson’s wife’s attorney and Segars-Andrews’ husband’s law firm 
had previously worked together on a legal matter worth approximately $300,000.180   
 On April 26, 2006, Mr. Simpson’s wife’s attorney filed a memorandum of law 
with an affidavit attached from Professor Nathan Crystal.181  Professor Crystal offered his 
professional opinion regarding Segars-Andrews’ recusal, and he concluded that she did 
not have to recuse herself and, in fact, had a duty to rule in the case.182 On May 3, 2006, 
Segars-Andrews agreed that she had a duty to rule in the case and that there was no duty 
to disclose the working relationship in which her husband was involved.183  Both the 
South Carolina Court of Appeals,184 and the South Carolina Commission on Judicial 
Conduct185 agreed with Segars-Andrews’ decision.  Unsatisfied, Mr. Simpson pursued his 
grievance and filed a complaint with the JMSC.186  Mr. Simpson had this to say:  
 
And once we called it [the deal between Segars-Andrews’ husband and his 
law partner, Mr. Shull] out on the table in front of her [Segars-Andrews], 
she recused herself.  And then now it’s another cover up of all the good 
old-boy-system, I feel like, and it’s cost me a lot of money and a lot of 
things had taken place and this is not right.  It don’t smell good.  It don’t 
look good.187 
                                                
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 26. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 26-27. 
180 Id. at 28-29. 
181 Id. at 28. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 28–29 (“After reviewing the memorandum provided from the [wife’s] counsel in this matter and 
the Canons, this court determines that it has a duty to rule in this case and that there was no duty to disclose 
the working relationship between.”). 
184 See Simpson v. Simpson, 660 S.E.2d 274 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (finding Segars-Andrews had not abused 
her discretion in making the division of marital property and an award of almost $80,000 in costs and 
attorneys fees to Mr. Simpson’s wife).   
185 See Segars-Andrews v. JMSC, 691 S.E.2d 453, 456 n.1 (S.C. 2010) (per curiam) (“The Commission on 
Judicial Conduct dismissed the complaint, finding there was no evidence Petitioner [Segars-Andrews] had 
violated any ethical rules.”); JMSC REPORT, supra note 171, at 11 (“Mr. Simpson then brought a complaint 
against Judge Segars-Andrews to the Office of Judicial Conduct on September 20, 2006. Judge Segars-
Andrews submitted a response on November 14, 2006. The complaint was summarily dismissed on 
November 22, 2006.”). 
186 JMSC REPORT, supra note 171, at 8. 
187 Id. at 12. 





 The judicial reforms of the late 1990s were directed in large part at remedying the 
perception that judicial elections were dominated by the “good-old-boy” system, and that 
this is to what Mr. Simpson alluded.188  What is far from patent is how Segars-Andrews 
could ever have been seriously decried as being representative of this system.  Unlike a 
vast majority of her colleagues who, in 1993, came from the General Assembly, Segars-
Andrews was elected after having been in private practice in Charleston, S.C., since 
1984.189  In 2008, Segars-Andrews’ service to the Charleston County Juvenile Drug 
Court earned her the recognition of the South Carolina House of Representatives.190  
Unfortunately, a majority of the JMSC gave short shrift to the overwhelming evidence of 
Segars-Andrews’ fitness to remain on the family court bench.191      
By a 7–3 vote,192 the JMSC found Segars-Andrews unqualified because “Segar-
Andrews’ conduct caused an appearance of impropriety that led a litigant not only to 
question [her] ability to render a fair and impartial decision, but also to lose faith in the 
integrity of this state’s judicial system.”193 Senator Glen McConnell,194 the author of the 
majority’s opinion and chairman of the JMSC at the time,195 wrote that Segars-Andrews’ 
conduct “create[ed] within a reasonable mind the perception that her ability to carry out 
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence was impaired.”196 
Interpreting197 and applying Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Sen. McConnell 
and the majority found that Segars-Andrews did not avoid the appearance of 
                                                
188 See supra text accompanying note 72–75. 
189 See Judge Frances P. Segars-Andrews, JUDGEPEDIA, 
http://judgepedia.org/index.php/Frances_P._Segars-Andrews (last visited June 17, 2013).  
190 See H.R.J. Res. 5292, 117th Sess. (S.C. 2008).   
191 See generally JMSC REPORT, supra note 171, at 24–33 (comments of Professor John P. Freeman).  The 
only ethics expert on the Commission, Professor Freeman drafted an eloquent dissent from the majority’s 
views.  Id.   
192 Id. at 2 (“The Commission, in a 7 to 3 vote, found Judge Segars-Andrews to be Not Qualified. The 
attached Report details this candidate’s qualifications as they relate to the Commission’s evaluative 
criteria.”). 
193 Id. at 8. 
194 Senator McConnell was sworn in as the Lt. Governor on March 9, 2012 after then-Lt. Governor Ken 
Ard resigned and was sentenced for scheming to defraud the public with campaign funds. See S.C. Lt. Gov. 
Ard Sentenced on Ethics Violations, THE TIMES AND DEMOCRAT (Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://thetandd.com/news/s-c-lt-gov-ard-sentenced-on-ethics-laws-violations/article_f62f9228-69fa-11e1-
980d-001871e3ce6c.html. 
195 See id. at 2.  For more detailed information about the Commission, including current composition and 
procedures, see generally Judicial Merit Selection Commission, SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/JudicialMeritPage/JMSCMainPage.php (last visited June 6, 2013). 
196 JMSC REPORT, supra note 171, at 17 (comments of Senator Glenn F. McConnell). 
197  Senator McConnell’s interpretation of the Canons directly conflicts with the conclusions of four 
authorities that addressed the same set of facts:  the court of appeals, the ethics commission, Professor 
Crystal, and Professor Freeman.   Senator McConnell made the following statement: “The Canons impose a 
burden on judges to keep informed of the personal and economic interests of the judge and the judge’s 
spouse as well as requiring them to vigilantly monitor personal and professional affiliations in order to 
avoid conflicts of interest. Judge Segars-Andrews should have been very alert to this duty, given that her 
husband was a practicing attorney in a law firm, a matrimonial mediator in domestic relation cases in the 
family court, and might share fees with attorneys appearing before her.” JMSC REPORT, supra note 171, at 
21 (comments of Senator Glenn F. McConnell). 
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impropriety.198  Finding Segars-Andrews unqualified to continue serving as a family 
court judge, the JMSC ended the career of a 16-year veteran jurist.199 
On January 22, 2010, the Supreme Court of South Carolina granted200 Segars-
Andrews’ petition to hear her case in the court’s original jurisdiction.201  Segars-Andrews 
challenged the constitutionality of the JMSC on three grounds: (1) the presence of 
legislators on the JMSC violates the state’s ban against dual office holding;202 (2) the 
presence of legislators on the JSMC contravenes the manifest intent of the 1997 
amendment, which Segars-Andrews argued was to create a body wholly apart from the 
General Assembly;203 and (3) the JMSC threatens judicial independence, which is 
necessary to the proper and legitimate functioning of the judiciary.204  Oral argument was 
heard on March 2, 2010, and the court issued an opinion on March 23, 2010,205 
expressing that the court felt “constrained”206 to dismiss Segars-Andrews’ complaint. 
The first problem with the court’s holding is its cursory review of the dual office 
holding, or ex officio, argument that Segars-Andrews raised in her petition.   
B. Dual Office Holding 
Segars-Andrews argued that sitting legislators are constitutionally ineligible for 
membership on the JMSC.207  To prevail on this claim, Segars-Andrews had to prove that 
service on the JMSC is a constitutional office and, consequently, legislators who sat on 
the JMSC violated the dual office holding prohibition of the South Carolina Constitution, 
as set forth in article III, section 24.208  As to whether service on the JMSC is a 
constitutional office, the court found in Segars-Andrews’ favor, holding that “[t]he 
exercise of power of the sovereign by the JMSC is seen not only in its ability to favorably 
submit judicial candidates to the Legislature for consideration, but more importantly in its 
                                                
198 Id. at 16. 
199 Martha Neil, 16-Year Judge Loses Seat on Bench Over Husband’s Peripheral Role in 1 Divorce Case, 
A.B.A. J., http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/16-
year_judge_loses_seat_on_bench_over_husbands_peripheral_role_ 
in_1_divorc/ (Mar. 24, 2010). 
200 Order Granting Petition for Original Jurisdiction, Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d 453 (S.C. 2010) (No. 
2010-01-22-01), available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2010-
01-22-01. 
201 In its original jurisdiction, the Court “may allow actions to be commenced in the [Court] and may issue 
mandamus, certiorari and other extraordinary writs. Normally, this only occurs when the case involves 
significant public interest or other unusual circumstances.” South Carolina Supreme Court, S.C. JUD. 
DEP’T, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/supreme/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
202 See Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d at 461–63 (addressing the dual office holding argument); see also 
League Brief, supra note 167, at 2-4 (discussing how allowing legislators to sit on the Commission violates 
the state constitution’s prohibition against dual office holding).  
203 See id. at 458–61 (addressing the separation of powers argument); see also League Brief, supra note 
202, at 2–4 (discussing separation of powers concerns implicated by the Commission’s decision). 
204 See id. at 463–64 (addressing judicial independence concerns raised by Segars-Andrews and various 
amici curiae); see also League Brief, supra note 202, at 7 (“Judicial independence means, at least, that the 
judiciary is neither dominated nor controlled by the political branches and that it is disentangled to the 
extent possible from the forces that influence those branches’ policy choices.”).  
205 Id. at 453. 
206 Id. at 456 (“[W]e are constrained to dismiss the complaint.”). 
207 Id. at 461. 
208 Id. (citing S.C. CONST. art. III, § 24). 




power to exclude candidates.”209  The court reasoned that since the Legislature lacks the 
authority to consider a judicial candidate whose name is not submitted by the JMSC,210 
there could be “no serious contention that the JMSC is not a constitutional office . . . .”211  
Instead of ending its analysis there and holding that legislative membership on the JMSC 
violated the dual office holding ban, the court continued by stating that “[a] finding of an 
‘office,’ for constitutional purposes does not end the inquiry.”212  The court claimed that 
its jurisprudence contains “a narrow, yet firmly established, exception”213 known as the 
“ex officio” or “incidental duties” exception.214  Citing no case to support its rule 
statement, the court characterized the ex officio exception as one that “may be properly 
invoked only where there is a constitutional nexus in terms of power and responsibilities 
between the first office and the ‘ex officio’ office.”215  To support its conclusion, the 
court cited to and relied upon two of its precedents: Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer 
District216 and Spartanburg County v. Miller.217  There is, however, a glaring gap in the 
Court’s analysis: the ex officio exception is far from “firmly established.”  The following 
analysis of these two cases, along with analysis of the cases to which each cites, will 
provide the necessary background for understanding the significance of the Segars-
Andrews court’s application of the ex officio exception.   
Neither Ashmore nor Miller applied the ex officio exception.  In Ashmore, the 
court held that “a member cannot sit upon the board of auditorium trustees. . . and at the 
same time retain his membership in the General Assembly.”218  Although the court 
invalidated the statute as violative of the dual office holding prohibition, the court stated 
in dicta that “[t]he rule here enforced with respect to double or dual officeholding in 
violation of the constitution is not applicable to those officers upon whom other duties 
relating to their respective offices are placed by law.”219  The court explained the 
exception by offering the example of “ex officio membership upon a board or 
commission of the unit of government which the officer serves in his official capacity, 
and the functions of the board or commission are related to the duties of the office.”220  
Next, the court offered a more specific example of when the ex officio exception would 
apply: “In mind as an example is an airport operated by two or more units of government.  
A governing board of it might be properly created by appointment ex officio of officers 
of the separate governmental units whose duties of their respective offices have 
reasonable relation to their functions ex officio.”221  Finally, in support of its analysis, the 
court cites two cases: State ex rel. Ray v. Blease222 and McCullers v. Board of Wake 
                                                
209 Id. 
210 See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27 (“No person may be elected . . . unless he or she has been found qualified 
by the [JMSC].”).  
211 Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d at 462. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. (emphasis added). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 44 S.E.2d 88 (S.C. 1947). 
217 Spartanburg County v. Miller, 132 S.E. 673 (S.C. 1924). 
218 Ashmore, 44 S.E.2d at 90. 
219 Id. at 95. 
220 Id. 
221 Id.  
222 79 S.E. 247 (S.C. 1913). 
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County.223  Neither of these cases is persuasive.  In Blease, the court never reached the 
question of whether the ex officio exception applies because the court concluded as a 
threshold matter that the office in question was not a constitutional office and, therefore, 
the dual office holding prohibition did not apply.224  McCullers is a North Carolina case 
that interpreted the dual office holding prohibition enshrined in the North Carolina 
constitution, but its analysis does not shed any light on South Carolina’s dual office 
holding jurisprudence.225  Thus, the Ashmore case provides us with a vaguely defined, 
never-before-applied ex officio exception, with only two unhelpful cases cited as support. 
Equally as unenlightening as Ashmore is Miller.  As an initial matter, it should be 
noted that the Miller court was not even presented with a constitutional challenge based 
on the constitution’s dual office holding provision.226  The Miller court clearly stated that 
it was addressing whether the act in question violated the separation of powers clause of 
the constitution.227   Additionally, the only case to which Miller cites for support of its 
analysis is Stockman v. Leddy,228 a Colorado case that does not address dual office 
holding.229  Thus, Miller is wholly unhelpful for purposes of a constitutional analysis 
under the dual office holding provision of the constitution since the case deals 
exclusively with separation of powers concerns. 
Neither of the cases to which the Segars-Andrews court cites provides a sufficient 
precedential basis for applying the ex officio exception.  Interestingly enough, the one 
case that does provide support for application of the exception was cited nowhere in the 
Segars-Andrews opinion.  Five years after Ashmore, the supreme court decided Welling v. 
Clinton Newberry Natural Gas Authority.230  In Welling, the petitioner challenged the 
constitutionality of an act that created the Clinton Newberry Natural Gas Authority.231  
The act provided that the Authority would “consist of seven members, six of whom shall 
be members ex officio,”232 and the ex officio members consisted of the mayors of Clinton 
and Newberry, along with two members of each municipality’s city council chosen by 
their respective city councils.233   The petitioner challenged the act as violative of article 
2, section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution.234  Without providing any substantive 
analysis, the court held that “[i]t was distinctly recognized in [Ashmore] that ex officio 
membership of the character here involved did not contravene this constitutional 
provision.”235 If the Segars-Andrews court had to rely on any precedent, it surely should 
                                                
223 73 S.E. 816 (N.C. 1912). 
224 Blease, 79 S.E. at 251 (“The answer to this objection is that membership in the [Sinking Fund 
Commission] is not an office.”). 
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226 See Spartanburg Cnty. v. Miller, 132 S.E. 673, 676 (S.C. 1924) (“The third proposition advanced is that 
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have cited Welling, especially since Welling is the court’s first application of the ex 
officio exception.  The second application, of course, is in Segars-Andrews itself. 
When the dust finally settles, we are left with only two examples of when it is 
appropriate to apply the “ex officio” exception.  The first example is “an airport operated 
by two or more units of government,” where the governing board “might be properly 
created by appointment ex officio of officers of the separate governmental units whose 
duties of their respective offices have reasonable relation to their functions ex officio.”236  
The second example is the natural gas Authority that was the focus of the Welling case.237  
Both of these examples provide us with two general cases in which the ex officio 
exception may apply: (1) a joint venture by two municipalities (or counties) to provide 
services to citizens of both municipalities (or counties), and (2) the creation of an 
oversight board comprised of elected officials of each municipality.   In light of these 
examples, the ex officio exception is narrow, indeed.  However, the intent of the 
exception, in light of these cases, is clear.  The exception appears to exist to allow elected 
officials of a unit of state government to enjoy membership on a governing board for 
purposes of furthering or protecting the interests of each respective member’s 
municipality.  At least, that could have been the Segars-Andrews court’s conclusion had 
it chosen not to cherry-pick a loosely defined exception to an important constitutional 
rule and to allow that exception to dictate the rule.  That is precisely what the Segars-
Andrews court did. 
In light of the cases discussed above involving when it is appropriate to employ 
the ex officio exception, it should come as no surprise why the court held the way it did.  
First, it is unreasonable to conclude that all of the staff attorneys, law clerks, and justices 
at the supreme court overlooked the Welling case.  A simple Keyciting or Shepardizing 
would have picked up the case because it cited directly to Ashmore, the case to which the 
Segars-Andrews court cites as its primary authority.  If we presume, which I think we 
must, that the court was aware of Welling, then we must also conclude that their omission 
of that case was intentional.  If, then, the court intentionally sidestepped Welling in favor 
of Ashmore’s dicta and Miller’s inapposite separation of powers analysis, perhaps the 
court embellished a bit when it referred to the ex officio exception as “firmly 
established.”238   
Not only did the court’s dual office holding analysis prevent Segars-Andrews’ 
most obvious constitutional claim from succeeding, but the Segars-Andrews decision also 
greatly expanded the once narrow ex officio exception to the point of perhaps 
undermining the constitutional provision itself.  Whether or not the ex officio exception’s 
expansion will affect substantive change in the way the General Assembly crafts its laws 
remains to be seen.  However, it is certainly appropriate to ask whether such an 
expansion of a narrow exception threatens to dictate the constitutional rule itself.  What 
the court did in Segars-Andrews was allow the tail to wag the dog—a dangerous 
precedent to set when interpreting constitutional provisions. 
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C. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence 
 Separation of powers and judicial independence will be discussed together.  In 
response to Segars-Andrews’ argument that membership of sitting legislators on the 
JMSC violates separation of powers principles, the court concluded that article V, section 
27239 neither expressly nor by clear implication prevents legislative membership.240  The 
court continued by holding that “[t]he separation of powers argument that the Legislature 
is ‘both creating and executing’ law must be rejected.”241  In so doing, the court readily 
admitted that the JMSC has the power to decide “in a political context a matter 
concomitantly determined by the judicial branch.”242 Next, the court acknowledged that 
“judicial independence considerations are implicated.”243  In the very next sentence, 
however, the court retreated by refusing to intervene in what it decided was a purely 
political question.244  Invoking the political question doctrine, the court emphasized that it 
“will not rule on questions that are exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather 
than judicial.”245   
In general, when making a determination regarding whether a particular challenge 
presents a bona fide legal challenge or a nonjusticiable political question, the court 
considers its constitutional duty to review actions of the General Assembly,246 but the 
court also considers the extent to which adjudication of a question would place the court 
“in conflict with a coequal branch of government.”247  The United States Supreme Court 
has characterized the political question doctrine as “one of political questions, not one of 
political cases.”248  To be sure, the distinction is not always clear.  Nonetheless, the Court 
should not be “misled by mere pretenses,”249 and it must not abdicate its “solemn duty . . 
. to look at the substance of things whenever [it] enter[s] upon the inquiry whether the 
legislature has transcended the limits of its authority.”250   
Of particular interest, here is the fact that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s two 
authoritative cases addressing nonjusticiable political questions have one element in 
common: the JMSC.251  That the court’s modern political question jurisprudence can be 
found exclusively within the two cases in which the JMSC is the defendant might imply 
simply that the two cases have been the most ripe in which to discuss the doctrine.  Of 
course, it might also be reasonably inferred that the court has employed the doctrine as a 
shield to protect the court from having to face off with their legislative coequals across 
                                                
239 This section of the constitution created the JMSC. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27. 





245 Id. at 460 (citing S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. JMSC, 632 S.E.2d 277, 278 (S.C. 2006)). 
246 See id. at 460–61. 
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the street in the state capitol.252  In either event, the fact remains that the two main 
opinions from the court addressing the scope of nonjusticiable political questions are in 
the context of constitutional challenges directed at the JMSC. 
In Segars-Andrews, the South Carolina Supreme Court preoccupied itself with the 
contention that the JMSC per se violated separation of powers.253  What the court failed 
to do was delve deeper into the cause and effect relationship between an action of the 
JMSC on the one hand, and the reaction of South Carolina judges on the other.  That is, 
when does a political decision of the JMSC regarding one judge create a ripple effect 
throughout the South Carolina judiciary such that judges charged with conducting 
themselves according to the Judicial Canons as interpreted and applied by the judicial 
branch feel obligated to reconsider their behavior in light of how the JMSC has 
interpreted or might interpret the Canons?  The court in Segars-Andrews focused too 
much on validating the right of the JMSC under the constitution to use whatever criteria 
it desires to evaluate candidates.  As a result, the court neglected to seriously consider the 
absurdity of its own hypothetical, in which a court or commission within the judicial 
branch finds a judge guilty of misconduct by violating the Canons, but where the JMSC 
nonetheless decides to ignore those conclusions and find the judge qualified.254   
Such a hypothetical is far less probable and implicates far fewer independence 
concerns for the legislative branch than does a set of facts similar to the Segars-Andrews 
case.  For example, what is the likelihood that the politically accountable legislators on 
the JMSC are going to risk their seats by trying to explain to their constituents why they 
decided to ignore a prior finding made by the judicial branch that one of its own judges is 
guilty of misconduct?  Contrast that likelihood with the likelihood that the Segars-
Andrews ruling will be perceived as a carte blanche to impose even higher restrictions on 
judges than those required under the Canons.  This is not merely a likelihood—it is a 
promise from the mouth of Senator McConnell himself.  Immediately after the court 
handed down its opinion, Senator McConnell spoke to reporters outside the courtroom.255  
On Wednesday, March 24, 2010, The Post and Courier newspaper reported this: 
 
McConnell, R-Charleston, also called it a victory for higher standards for 
state judges. “This is a green light to us that we can have higher standards 
and that we can impose those higher standards,” he said. “Judges in the 
family court, they’re judge and jury there. A judge in the family court has 
broad discretion. And there is no assurance in South Carolina that you’re 
going to be a judge for life.”256 
 
                                                
252 The Supreme Court is located across the street from the State Capitol.  See Location Map—Supreme 
Court Building, S.C. JUD. DEP’T, http://www.sccourts.org/gmaps/supremeMap.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2010). 
253 See Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d at 459 (“The separation of powers argument that the Legislature is 
‘both creating and executing’ law must be rejected.”). 
254 See id. (“Assume the court of appeals reversed [Segars-Andrews’] decision not to recuse or that the 
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255 See Robert Behre, Justices Side with Panel, The Post and Courier (Mar. 23, 2010, 11:25 AM), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20100324/PC1602/303249959. 
256 Id. 
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How far legislators are willing to go in light of this “green light” is unclear.  What 
is clear, however, is that legislators are unwilling to relinquish any control over the 
process anytime soon. 
It is axiomatic that South Carolina’s judges and justices are elected by the General 
Assembly.257  It is also axiomatic that only the JMSC has the constitutional authority to 
submit qualified applicants’ names to the General Assembly.258  What remains to be seen 
is how the South Carolina Supreme Court has given anything more than lip service to the 
notion of a constitutionally mandated independent judiciary.  The court cannot expect 
judges to take comfort in the fact that they may still be deemed qualified for reelection 
even in light of a reprimand from the court itself, while these same judges are now 
wondering which political impulse will provide the tainted lens through which Senator 
McConnell and other legislators on the JMSC will view a set of facts and haphazardly 
and inconsistently apply its own fickle interpretations of the Canons.  Where can a 
current judge go to obtain an ethics opinion, if not from experts like Professors Crystal 
and Freeman?  Should their inquiries, instead, be directed to the JMSC itself?  Can we as 
a sovereign political entity with a stake in the independent decision making abilities of 
our judges, afford the high price of allowing political whim to triumph over sound, well-
reasoned interpretations of judicial ethics?  And, most importantly, will the next judge 
that encounters a disgruntled litigant rule out of reason or trepidation?  Once a reasonable 
doubt exists about the answer to this last question, “judicial independence” means naught.  
D. Confronting the Elephant259 Head On 
 Judicial independence is, indeed, the “[t]he elephant in the room.”260  The 
Constitution of South Carolina provides for an independent judiciary.261  To be 
“independent” means to be free from dependence on another’s authority and, most 
importantly, not subject to external control or rule. . . .”262  This definition of 
“independent” has not changed since April 21, 1970, the date that the framers of article I, 
section 8 redrafted the separation of powers clause precisely as it existed previously in 
article I, section 14.263  To quote from the seminal case by Chief Justice Marshall: “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule. . . . This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”264  Unfortunately, South Carolina’s 
Marbury moment has come and gone, and the reality in South Carolina is simple:  It’s 
politics as usual in the state capitol.    
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260 Id. at 463. 
261 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
262 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).  
263 See State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 236 S.E.2d 406, 408 (S.C. 1977) (“[T]his resubmission of the 
separation of powers clause, in the exact language it had previously existed, expressed the contentment of 
the General Assembly, not merely with the separation of powers principle as originally expressed, but with 
those words as then judicially construed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.”). 
264 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803). 





All is not lost, however.  If change is to come, it must come from the people, for 
at least in South Carolina, the state supreme court has declined the invitation.  All 
political power is vested in and derived from the people only; therefore, the people have 
the right at all times to modify their form of government.265  As stated at the beginning of 
this Article, we propose solutions.  These solutions are necessarily limited to the two 
states we have focused on in this Article because South Carolina and Virginia remain the 
only states whose judicial selection process continues to be dominated exclusively by 
their legislatures.  First, in South Carolina, the state must adopt reform to the JMSC as it 
currently exists.  Title 2, Chapter 19 of the South Carolina Code266 dealing with the 
JMSC should be amended: (1) to preclude legislative membership;267 (2) to raise the cap 
on the number of qualified applicants’ names submitted to the General Assembly from 
three to no fewer than ten; and (3) to require the JMSC to give substantial weight to 
decisions of the court of appeals, the South Carolina Supreme Court, or ethics 
commissions within the judicial branch.268   
 The first measure—precluding legislative members from the JMSC—would cure 
the constitutional dual office holding violation and ensure that politics are kept as far 
removed from the decisionmaking process as practicable. Additionally, it would lend 
more credibility to the JMSC’s decisions.  The second measure—raising the cap on the 
number of qualified applicants’ names submitted to the General Assembly from three to 
no fewer than ten—is designed to increase the possibility that more minority applicants 
will be qualified by the JMSC and submitted for consideration by the General Assembly.  
Many have characterized the current system, where the JMSC may submit no more than 
three candidates’ names, as the “steak and two hamburgers” method.269  That is, the 
JMSC will pick the top candidate of the three, and the remaining two candidates are 
lesser-qualified applicants who stand little if any chance of garnering a sufficient number 
of votes in the legislature.  Expanding the number of qualified candidates put forth by 
JMSC to the legislature would mandate a more detailed explanation and raise public 
skepticism if the increased slate still included no or a bare minimum number of minority 
candidates.  The third measure would require the JMSC to give “substantial weight” to 
the ethics decisions of tribunals within the judicial branch.  “Substantial weight” means 
that the JMSC should view such decisions as persuasive rather than binding.  Moreover, 
the JMSC, if void of sitting legislators, may naturally be more apt to rely on the expertise 
and credibility of such decisions.  If enacted, any one of these measures would bring 
much needed reform to the current JMSC.  The desired result is for the General 
Assemblies to relinquish control over the merit selection process, once and for all.   
                                                
265 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 1(“Political power in people.”). 
266 S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10 et seq. (“Election of Justices and Judges”). 
267 Currently, the Commission includes six sitting legislators, three from the House of Representatives and 
three from the Senate, and only four non-legislators.  See § 2-19-10 (establishing the composition of the 
Commission). 
268 Currently, the Commission may submit no more than three qualified applicants’ names, notwithstanding 
the fact that more than three may be eminently qualified to run in the general election.  See § 2-19-80 
(“[The Commission] shall review the qualifications of all applicants for a judicial office and select 
therefrom and submit to the General Assembly the names and qualifications of the three candidates whom 
it considers best qualified for the judicial office under consideration.”). 
269 Our thanks to Dr. Barbara Zia for this information. 
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Similar measures could be adopted or enacted in Virginia in an attempt to weed 
politics out of the process, particularly, the adoption of a diverse qualifying commission 
that includes individuals outside of the state’s legislature. 
While Professor Ware raises legitimate concerns of elitism resulting from 
disproportionate influence by members of the Bar,270 surely NO input from members of 
the state Bar is equally dangerous.   It is hard to identify a group better suited to give 
input on necessary judicial temperament of a judicial candidate, legal acumen regarding 
an understanding of the law, and the required independent nature of their colleagues who 
will be chosen as a judge, than those who practice before the courts and among the 
candidates.  The exclusion of any meaningful input by members of the state Bar in both 
South Carolina and Virginia identifies a glaring weakness in judicial selection in both 
states.  Ideally, this commission would be comprised of members of the Bar, members of 
the legislature, and members at-large who would reflect the common man’s approach to 
the court system.  The lack of a truly diverse qualifying commission in both South 
Carolina and Virginia detracts significantly from their processes of judicial selection, and 
this simple solution may cure many criticisms of the current system, thereby 
depoliticizing a worthy selection process.  For as the 2010 Brennan Center report 
concluded, “[m]ore diverse Commissions end up nominating more diverse slates of 
candidates.”271 
CONCLUSION  
This Article has presented a brief historical sketch of the evolution of judicial 
selection in Virginia272 and South Carolina,273 culminating in the recent and controversial 
case involving former South Carolina Family Court Judge F.P. “Charlie” Segars-
Andrews.  In South Carolina, plenary control over the judicial election process remained 
in the General Assembly until 1997,274 at which time the new constitutional entity known 
as the Judicial Merit Selection Commission came into existence.275  Although the 
constitutional amendment submitted to the people for ratification did not state that sitting 
legislators would comprise a majority of the JMSC’s membership,276 the enabling 
legislation passed contemporaneously with the amendment provided for legislative 
dominance.277  In contrast, Virginia’s constitution has in the past provided for judicial 
selection via popular vote, but the legislative bodies chose to return to a process by which 
judicial selection is controlled exclusively by the legislature.  As a result of the structures 
in both Virginia and South Carolina, both states lend themselves to criticism and attack as 
demonstrated in the Segars-Andrews case.   
In 2009, a disgruntled litigant whose ethics complaint against Segars-Andrews 
had been dismissed by both the South Carolina Court of Appeals and the Commission on 
Judicial Conduct filed a complaint with the JMSC, raising the same issues addressed by 
                                                
270 See Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 757-59 (2009). 
271 TORES-SPELLISCY ET AL., supra note 2, at 10. 
272 See supra Part I.B. 
273 See supra Part I.A. 
274 See supra Part I.A.1.c. 
275 See supra Part I.A.I.d.; see also supra text accompanying note 57. 
276 See Segars-Andrews v. JMSC, 691 S.E.2d 453, 457-58 (S.C. 2010) (per curiam). 
277 See id. at 458–59. 




both the court and the commission.278  After considering the complainant’s case, the 
JMSC voted 7–3 to find Segars-Andrews unqualified to continue serving as a judge.279  
In her petition to the South Carolina Supreme Court,280 Segars-Andrews argued multiple 
constitutional grounds to invalidate the JMSC.281  The court subsequently dismissed the 
complaint after finding none of Segars-Andrews’ claims to have merit.282  In its opinion, 
the court held that the ex officio exception applied to Segars-Andrews’ dual office 
holding argument, but the court was not straightforward in its assessment of the viability 
of this exception.283  The court’s painstaking attempt to enlarge this dormant exception to 
cover the composition of the JMSC raises doubts about the extent of the exception’s 
scope and the resulting effect on the constitutional rule prohibiting dual office holding.284   
Segars-Andrews’ separation of powers and judicial independence arguments were 
not enough to persuade the court to consider them fully.285  Instead, the court invoked the 
political question doctrine and declined to scrutinize the decision of the JMSC.286  The 
court’s refusal to address the separation of powers concerns implicated by JMSC 
members’ interpretation and application of the Canons leaves judges at the mercy of 
disgruntled litigants like Mr. Simpson.287  Moreover, judges are left wondering whose 
interpretations of the Canons they should follow—the courts’ or the JMSC’s?288  When 
such uncertainty leads to a judge potentially ruling for or against a party out of fear of the 
JMSC’s reaction, or out of uncertainty as to the applicability of the Canons, an 
independent judiciary exists only in form, not in substance.289 
It is instructive to look at Virginia’s system of judicial selection in light of the 
decision in Segars-Andrews, given that Virginia and South Carolina are the only two 
states that incorporate a process of judicial selection vested exclusively in the General 
Assembly of the state.  The lessons learned from Segars-Andrews and the concerns it 
raises apply equally to the process in Virginia. 
In the absence of the court’s willingness to address the pressing issues 
surrounding judicial reform, the bench and the bar must galvanize the people and 
encourage them to petition their representatives to enact meaningful change.  We propose 
four solutions to be adopted in both states: (1) preclude sitting legislators from 
membership, at least in the majority, on any merit selection commission; (2) raise the cap 
in South Carolina on the number of qualified applicants submitted to the General 
Assembly from the current three to at least ten, or in Virginia  place a reasonable limit on 
the number of names submitted to the legislative delegation from which they may select; 
                                                
278 See supra Part III.A. 
279 See id. 
280 See supra Part III.A.; see also Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d at 457 (“Petitioner filed an action 
challenging the decision of the JMSC on multiple grounds, an action we accepted in our original 
jurisdiction.”). 
281 See supra Part III.A.; see also Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d at 457 (“Petitioner raises several 
constitutional challenges . . . .”). 
282 See supra Part III.A.; see also Segars-Andrews, 691 S.E.2d at 464 (dismissing the complaint). 
283 See supra Part III.B. 
284 See id.  
285 See supra Part III.A.C. 
286 See id. 
287 See id. 
288 See id. 
289 See id. 
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(3) require any merit selection commission, including the JMSC in South Carolina, to 
give “substantial weight” to ethics decisions rendered by a tribunal within the judicial 
department; and (4) include the state’s Bar association in the selection process.290 Real 
reform of South Carolina’s and Virginia’s legislatively dominated systems will take time. 
However, while advocating for improvement, let us also remember that these systems 
have already proven to be effective in increasing diversity when compared with other 
states’ judicial selection processes. To borrow from Winston Churchill,291 it may be the 
case that South Carolina’s and Virginia’s systems are the worst – except for all the others 
that have been tried. 
                                                
290 See supra Part III.E. 
291 Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: 
HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897–1963, 7566 (Robert Rhodes James, ed., 1974). 
